

Islamic Movements and the Future of Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia Era

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Abstrak

Sejak tahun 1998, Indonesia, sebagai negara muslim terbesar di dunia, mengalami transformasi dari rezim otoriter menjadi demokratis. Namun demikian, kekerasan dan terorisme yang diasosiasikan dengan gerakan Islam, khususnya gerakan Islam Politik, dianggap mengancam masa depan demokrasi Indonesia. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendeskripsikan gerakan Islam Politik dan dampaknya terhadap sistem demokrasi pasca-Suhart. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan jenis penelitian deskriptif analisis, sementara data diperoleh melalui kajian pustaka dan analisis dokumen. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa tindakan kekerasan dan terorisme dilakukan oleh Muslim fundamentalist yang bercita-cita ingin mewujudkan negara Islam. Dengan semakin banyak terjadi tindakan kekerasan dan terorisme justru memicu berkembangnya Muslim moderat. Dampak dari berkembangnya Muslim moderat, perilaku pemilih Muslim berubah mulai dari tidak ikut pemilu, merubah pilihan politik, sampai politik pragmatis. Dengan adanya kekerasan politik yang terjadi telah mendorong berkembangnya moderasi Islam, sehingga merugikan partai Islam karena banyak pemilih Muslim yang mengalihkan pilihan politiknya ke partai Nasionalis-religius.

Kata Kunci: Demokrasi, Fundamentalis, Gerakan Islam

Abstract

Since 1998, Indonesia, as the biggest Muslim country in the world, has transformed from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. However, violence and terrorism associated with the Islamic movement, especially the movement of political Islam, are considered to threaten the future of Indonesian democracy. The purpose of the study is to describe the Political Islam Movement and its impact on the post-Suharto democratic system. This study uses qualitative research methods with descriptive analysis research, while the data is obtained through literature review and document analysis. This study found that acts of violence and terrorism were carried out by fundamentalist Muslims who aspired to realize an Islamic state. However, these acts of violence and terrorism triggered the development of moderate Muslims. The consequences of the development of moderate Muslims are the changing of Muslim political behavior, starting from not participating in elections, changing political choices, and up to pragmatic politics. The political violence that has occurred has encouraged the development of Islamic moderation, thus harming Islamic parties because Muslim voters have diverted their political choices to the nationalist-religious parties.

Keywords: Democracy, Fundamentalis, Islamic Movement,

Introduction

After the fall of Suharto (Shiraishi, 2020), violence and terrorism were the common issues associated with the Islamic Movement, especially the Islamic Political Movement (Shalihin, 2017). These radical movements were alleged as a consequence of the development of Islamic understanding from the Middle East and the historical heritage of the Indonesian revolution, such as NII (Umam, 2019). However, the Islamic Movement commonly comes from the Middle East, aiming to change the system of government based on Islamic ideology (establishing an Islamic State) (Hakim, 2018). Therefore, many arguments state that raising groups of the Islamic Political Movement will threaten the survival of Indonesian democracy since they are exclusive, intolerant, and radical (Khamid, 2016). Therefore, studies related to Islamic Movements, especially political Islam, are important.

As a newly born democracy, however, there are still threats to the democratic system in Indonesia (Duile & Bens, 2017). After the fall of Soeharto, many acts of violence and terrorism were carried out by radical Islamic movements that generally have links to transnational Islam (Umar, 2010). The activities of the transnational Islamic Movement are not based on territorial governance (nation-state) but focus on the concept of ideology as a blessing for the universe. Additionally, although Islam can be a religion that is considered to bring peace, some radical Islamic groups and terrorist groups argue that they are strict in the name of Islam. According to Shalihin (2017), „There [were] at least four acts of terrorism in 2000; three acts of terrorism in 2001; and one act of terrorism in the 2000 Bali bombing, which was the most dramatic act of terrorism and the bombing at J.W. Marriot hotel in 2003. These acts of terrorism are facts which suggest that the Movement of Salafism flourished in Indonesia „ Meanwhile, their end will face many challenges due to the number of these fundamental Islamic groups being very small compared to the moderate Islamic groups represented by the NU and Muhammadiyah organizations (Menchik, 2019)

However, Indonesia's policy got into a dilemma with the raising of the Islamic Political Movement. On the one hand, democratization is creating a democratic national and state life to guarantee the freedom of the Islamic Movement (Arifin, Bachtiar, Fuad, Tongat, & Wahyudi, 2019). On the other hand, the Islamic Political Movement, at a certain level, shows the opposite and sometimes even damages the democratic spirit (Robison & Hadiz, 2017). Although the seeds of fundamentalism and conservatism cannot be concluded directly, they lead to extreme and intolerant actions such as terror (Christmann, 2012). Some intolerant

and violent acts have been carried out by groups affiliated with fundamentalist or conservative organizations (Hamayotsu, 2014) either to implement Islamic law more rigorously (formalize Islamic law) or even to establish the Khilafah Islamiyah, which means replacing the ideology of Pancasila.

The raising of the conservative seemed to provide momentum for the revival of the ideology of Islamism, which faithfully held onto the political desire to „Islamize the state“. Its revival is certainly worth watching out for. Not only because it saves the potential for violence in achieving its ideological goals, but also because its manifestations have the potential to disturb national diversity and unity. In terms of political ideas, this ideology is a serious threat to the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI/Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) as well as undermining the ideals of Islam and so declaring it as a mercy to the universe (*rahmatan li al-'alāmîn*). Meanwhile, the majority of moderate Muslims in Indonesia will not support the issue of an Islamic state, so the issue of an Islamic state will not be widespread (Tajuddin, 2016). Consequently, the Islamist party would get challenged to reach power in Parliament due to a lack of popular support from the moderate Muslim voter. However, on the other hand, most Muslims also will be supporters of the government policies toward the Islamic political movement group that promotes the establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah; for example, they support the government policy to ban HTI. Likewise, the arrangement of numerous parties toward Islamic radicals also promotes a situation dismissing savagery and refusing the radical idea of Islam (Maghfuri, 2019).

The literature study shows that there is still little study of Islamic movements, mainly Islamic political movements associated with democracy in Indonesia. Moreover, the results of Vosviewer's analysis also show that the linkages between political movements, especially Islamic political movements and Islamic politics seem far apart, none of which even relates them to democracy. This means that the study of Islamic political movements associated with Islamic politics and democracy still shows novelty. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to describe the raising of the Islamic political Movement and what is the effect on the future of Indonesia's democracy in the Post-Suharto Era.

method used is a systematic literature review. Literature study is essential in scientific research; basically, the progress of knowledge must be built on pre-existing work. The literature review must be valid, reliable, and repeatable as a scientific question (Xiao & Watson, 2019) The research phase begins with tracing literature using the Publish or Perish (PoP) application. The journal article selection method is based on the time of publication (from 2017 to 2022) which is limited to 500, keywords (Islam, Fundamentalist, Islamic Movement, Islamic Political Movement, and Democracy) and database (google scholar). From the results of tracing literature, around 200 relevant journal articles will be used as a source of data mining related to the Islamic political Movement and democracy. After that, the existing literature is reviewed to find the most relevant and beneficial authorities to the research object and get 50 relevant pieces of literature. The primary data came from the Article journal, and the secondary data came from the books and the national election commission website ([ww.kpu.go.id](http://www.kpu.go.id)).

After the data has been collected, the next step is data analysis by systematically reviewing and comparing the data found. The data analysis techniques were content analysis. Content analysis is an in-depth discussion of the contents of printed or non-printed information sourced from the internet. The analysis in this library research is to analyze documents and journal articles from research related to Islamic movements, elections, political parties, and democracy. The stages in this analysis in this study are: first, utilizing, namely uniting, grouping, and identifying data that will be used as a research source; second, sampling, in qualitative research means taking important information from various research sources so that the data presented is not too large ; third, recording, which means collecting research data carefully by recording or coding the data so that it is easier to understand ; Fourth, reducing, namely the process of selecting and focusing on important data. The reduction was made by selecting data that has been reduced; sixth, analyzing, analyzing and describing the data that has been found; and seventh, narrating, namely describing and presenting the data that has been analyzed into a narrative so that it becomes a conclusion.

Result and Discussions

Typologies of the Islamic Movement

The typologies of the Islamic Movement gave birth to many variants (Table 1). Even to a certain degree, each of them decreases different styles of Islamic thought and ideology,

paradigmatically contradicting each other. Revivalism and fundamentalism, among others, led to traditional conservative-style Islamic movements and puritan fundamentalists. Meanwhile, Islamic reformism, which paradigmatically rests on the spirit of modernism, gave birth to a variant of the Islamic Movement from a reformist-modernist to a secular-modernist pattern. In the meantime, according to Nathsir, from the womb of Islamic modernism an advanced character emerged, namely Islamic neo-modernism. Beyond all the features, Umam cited the statement of Noer, „There are still other styles of Islamic movements, namely Islamic traditionalism which in the progressive circles raises the wings of the Islamic post-traditionalism movement” (Umam, 2019).

Table 1

Typology of Islamic Groups in Indonesia

	Typology	Group
1.	Religious caliphate	Hizbut al-Tahrir, MMI, JI
2.	Islamic State in Indonesia	KOMPAK, Laskar Jundulah, Laskar Mujahidin
3.	Sharia for Muslims in Pluralist State But No Democracy	Laskar Jihad
4.	Sharia for Muslims Within Pluralist Democracy	PBB, PKS, KISDI, GPI, FPI
5.	Pluralist Democracy With Greater Role for Islam	PPP
6.	Secular, Pluralist Democracy	Muhammadiyah, PAN, NU, Golkar, PDIP

These movement types emerged on a broad scale which was the fruit of western (European) interaction with the Islamic world as well as the reaction of Muslims to western colonial lust. For example, the classification from Prajuli was a classification of Islamic movement groups in post-Suharto into six categories such as religious caliphates, Islamic State in Indonesia, Sharia for Muslims in a Pluralist State But No Democracy, Sharia for Muslims within a Pluralist Democracy, Pluralist Democracy With Greater Role for Islam, Secular, and Pluralist Democracy (Prajuli, 2012).

Moreover, ideologically, regarding the contemporary Islamic Movement in Indonesia, Umman (2019) created the classification of Islamic Movement into three categories (Table 2). First, transformative Islamic groups focusing on Islam as an integral part of Indonesianness; rejecting the dominance of Islamic ideology and making it the only alternative national life system; Islam is in a complementary position amidst the mosaic of Indonesian life. Secondly, the group that presents Islam as a value must dominate the constitutional and social order, although not necessarily formal-institutionalized. Finally, a

movement group that insists on putting Islam as the only alternative for every record or system of life, in the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions; even Islam is as a single system at the global level,,(Umam, 2019).

In that last category, Islamists built their existence mode. In recent studies, their famous Islamic-political ideology is called Islamism. Regarding the paradigmatic Islamic model, this ideology tends to carry a definite pattern of Islam, an opposite diametric pattern with two other relatively absolute and relative patterns. This pattern focuses on the elements of culture and things that are qat'iyyat (certain) so that their religious performance is rigid and does not compromise the disparity of beliefs and plurality of truth. As a political ideology, Islamism rests on the principle that Islam is a religion and a state (al-Islam dîn wa dawlah). It is an ideological principle that views Islam as a political system and believes that fighting for the establishment of a state or Islamic caliphate is a primary obligation of every Muslim. In recent studies, Islamism is increasingly used to designate the ideology of Muslim movements that make Islam a political ideology to build what is called an „Islamic State“ or „Islamic Caliphate“.

Table 2

Classification, strategy, and agenda of Islamic movement in Indonesia

Classification	Strategy	Organization	Agenda
transformative Islamic groups	1. focusing on Islam as an integral part of Indonesianness; 2. rejecting the dominance of Islamic ideology and making it the only alternative national life system. 3. Islam is in a complementary position amidst the mosaic of Indonesian life.	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), and al-Irshad.	Make Islam a Rahmatan lil-Alamin.
Islam as values Groups	Must dominate the constitutional and social order, although not necessarily formal-institutionalized.	PKS, PPP, PBB, PBR, PAN dan PKB.	Make Islam a value.
a movement group	1. insists on putting Islam as the only alternative for every record or system of life in the political, social,	MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia), and HTI (Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia).	Make Islam a political ideology to build what is called an “Islamic State” or

economic, and cultural dimensions. 2. Islam is a single system at the global level.	“Islamic Caliphate.
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On the other hand, Endang Turmudi divided Islamic radicalism into three (3) forms of Movement: Firstly, some fight to implement Islamic law without the need to establish an Islamic state. FPI and Laskar Jihad represented this first group. The orientation of Islamic radicalism is more on the application of Sharia at the community level, not at the state level; it is just that they tend to use violent means or approaches. Secondly, fighting for the founding of the Islamic State of Indonesia, the second group was represented by NII, which was initially initiated by Kartosoewiryo, who also served as an NII priest. Thirdly are groups who want to realize the Islamic caliphate. This group is represented by the Indonesian Hizb-Tahrir movement (HTI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), which fights for the establishment of a universal khilafah with Islamic law as its basis (Laisa, 2014).

The phenomenon of Islamism seems to have strengthened and continues to overwhelm public space, especially since the New Order regime collapsed in 1998. Islamists appeared and found their revival momentum as a wave of successful reforms that overthrew the New Order regime. This regime constantly suppressed their existence and clung to them as „extreme right”. The opening of speech and association freedom became the initial momentum for the proliferation of the main organs supporting the ideology of Islamism, such as MMI (*Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia*) and HTI (*Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia*). With the ideology of Islam (Shupe, 2009) they carry out various political-religious agendas with militant performance and tend to be radical. Their existence is so distinctive and, therefore, diametrically different from predecessor socio-religious organizations, such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Muhammadiyah*, *Nahdlatul Wathan* (NW) and *al-Irshad*, which tend to take the path of moderation in religious thought and political praxis.

As we have elaborated, many typologies of Islamic Movements correlate. As we stated above, this study aims to analyze the impact of violence and terrorism on the future of Indonesia's democracy. For the interest of the research, we focus on the type of Islamic Movement, namely moderate and radical/extremist. In terms of counterterrorism discourse, Moderate Islam and Moderate Muslim is a label used as the differentiator of „Islamic extremism,” implying that the support of Islamic terrorism is the characteristic of a „radical“ faction within Islam and that there is a „moderate“ faction of Muslims who denounce

extremist violence such as Islamic terrorism. On the other hand, according to Robison and Hadiz, „moderate Muslim activists...“ took part in...discussions with their Arab counterparts „... to promote Indonesia's religious soft power“ (Robison & Hadiz, 2017)

Indonesia's Democracy: Toward the End of Islamist Party

Since the first democratic elections were held in 1955, scientists considered that stream-based cleavages were still a significant factor influencing voter political behavior and lasted until 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 1997 elections under the New Order's repressive regime. After the fall of Soeharto, the political power based on the political stream is still considered to influence the political constellation in Indonesia, but a polemic has begun to occur. As a case in point, the poles who continue to support the political stream are represented by Dwight King (2003) in his book „Half-Hearted Reform, Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia“ and Anis Baswedan (2004) in his writings entitled „Circulation of the Vote in the 2004 elections“ (Baswedan, 2004b). While the opposite pole is represented by Bill Liddle and Saiful Mujani (2004) in their work „Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behavior in Indonesia “. Their findings are essential because they could be the first clues to the operation of democracy in post-Soeharto.

Moreover, King presents an exciting discussion using statistical analysis in the form of bivariate analysis techniques and multiple regressions to compare the results of the 1955 and 1999 elections. The data used are national aggregate data from the election results and geographical data tested with indicators such as urbanization, government activity, Islam, literacy rates, inequality factors, and development programs. The resulting conclusion was „the continuation of the political stream such as the phenomenon of the 1955 Old Order election to the 1999 election reform order “(Arumsari & Rahayu, 2016). Likewise, Baswedan, who was also King's former guide, tried to compare voter support patterns in the 1999 and 2004 elections by adopting King's method. Baswedan found a significant correlation between support for Islamic parties in each city and regency during the two elections. Equally, the Nationalist and Christian parties were strongly supported in the regions, which were the basis of PDI-P support. The conclusion is that „at the community level, there are still political stream-based patterns in the 2004 elections “(Baswedan, 2004).

On the other hand, different results from what was found by King and Baswedan, Liddle, and Mujani found that the influence of religious orientation or political stream on

the votes of the 1999 and 2004 elections was minimal (Mujani, Liddle, Mujani & Liddle, 2020). Liddle and Mujani found that the leadership factor was a significant factor influencing the political behaviour of voters. This was explained by Liddle and Mujani as the impact of the development of the mass media, especially television, to remote areas. On the other hand, Nurjaman stated that the political stream (aliran) in post-Suharto Indonesia was preceded, but with a few changes. The changes in the political stream connected with the political instability of parties individually, which contributed to the instability of the Islamic Party as a group. Among the Islamic parties, both Islamist and Islam Inclusive parties experienced instability, but the Islamist parties saw higher instability than the Islam Inclusive parties, particularly from 2009-2019. Parties that have survived from 1999 to the show time can be categorized as regulating parties, meaning they have roots within the community. Indeed, although the appointive execution of Islamic parties is attending to the decay, the political stream (aliran) has not ended because some Islamic parties still exist, despite their vote decreasing (Nurjaman, Suprpto, & Masmuh, 2018).

Like the previous point, correlating with the decline of Islam's inclusive PKB and the survival of the PKS as the Islamist party, Kikue claim that „the decline of the moderate PKB is the result of the permeation of personality-based clientelistic and ascriptive relations as well as lack of party institutionalization. On the other hand, the puritanical Islamist PKS's political survival is explained by organizational cohesion achieved through party institutionalization. Moreover, a disciplined party structure has allowed PKS elites to achieve controversial ideological adjustments. In short, a moderate centralist religious ideology or outlook alone is insufficient to achieve political survival in the competitive environment of electoral and religious politics (Kikue, 2011).

The Future of Democracy in Indonesia

As we mentioned above, terrorism has adverse effects not only for them but also for Muslims as a whole. One effect is a stigma on people about how to look, worship, and political identity. In terms of political identity, if we borrow the term Geertz political flow, that is, Muslim Santri, both Modernist and Traditionalist, who are identified with the Islamic Party, their political identity (party ID) turns to liquid. These phenomena affect the erosion of political streams (aliran), especially for Santri in the election. The natural consequence for the Muslims is changing their political behavior, such as not participating, swinging their voices, or even becoming pragmatic. For analysis, we use an Islamic classification derived

from Anis Baswedan but not wholly. Between parties, Baswedan categories of parties in Indonesia are divided into three categories: Islamist, Inclusive Islam, and Inclusive Secular (Fig. 1). We use the categories of Islam, namely Islamist and inclusive Islam; on the other hand, secular, we are changing inclusive by Nationalists. Moreover, correlating with the categories of Islamist parties used in this paper are those claiming Islam is their ideology.

First, we would identify some popular parties in the post-Soeharto system: the Islamic Party (Islam inclusive and Islamist) and the Nationalist Party. The Islamist party is a party that lists Islam as a party ideology such as namely the Crescent Star Party (PBB, *Partai Bulan Bintang*), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*), Nahdlatul Ummah United Party (PPNU, *Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia*), the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*); an inclusive Islamic party is a party that has a historical and sociological relationship with Islam, namely National Mandate Party (PAN, *Partai Amanat Nasional*) (Muhammadiyah) and National Awakening Party (PKB, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*) (NU); Nationalist is a party that does not list Islam as party ideology nor has historical or sociological ties with Islam such as Functional Groups Party (Golkar, *Partai Golongan Karya*), Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle (PDI-P, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan*), and the Democrat Party (Demokrat, *Partai Demokrat*).




Figure 2
The Pattern of Islamic Politics

Historically, the new parties that succeeded in the 1999 elections were a historical continuation of parties born in the 1950s (Figure 1). We know that in 1950 several parties became significant powers, such as the PNI, Masjumi, and the NU. The PNI, founded by the former President of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno, in the post-New Order elections, was identical to the PDI-P led by Megawati, Sukarno's eldest son. The Nahdhatul Ulama Party, which participated in the 1955 elections in third place, was followed by the National Awakening Party (PKB), founded by Abdurahman Wahid, known as Gusdur, the former Chairman of the NU and grandson of NU founder Kh. Haji Hasyim Asari. While the Masyumi party, which belongs to the modernist Islamic group, is most closely followed by the Crescent Star Party (PBB) with chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra; in addition to the United Nations, there is also the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Masyumi Party. Although it was founded and led by Amin Rais, former Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah, PAN is Indonesia's most prominent modernist Islamic group. However, Amin Rais, as the founding father, does not want PAN to become a sectarian party. Therefore, not only in the management that includes pluralist elements, the party's principle is not Islamic but Pancasila.

The success story of the Islamic Party in 1955 in the first election 1999 has to stag due to the proliferation of terrorist acts. As we know, terrorist acts that occurred after the fall of Soeharto approached the entire territory of Indonesia, especially in big cities such as Jakarta, Bali, Medan, Malang, and others. The data shows that in the election year 1999-2003 violence and terrorism occurred 14 times, followed by eight times from 2004-2008, eight times from 2009-2013, and 10 times from 2014- 2019. Since the violence and terrorism occurred, there have been significant impacts on people's lives, especially Muslims, who often get a negative stigma. Even though the quantitative test of correlation between the incidents of radicalism and the reduction of party votes is not conducted, the data shows that the incidents of violence and terrorism involving the Islamic Movement have an impact on the decline of Islamic party votes, both Islamist and Islam inclusive (Table 3).

The election result shows that the Nationalist Party experienced a steadily increasing vote from 1999 to 2019, whereas on the other hand, Islamic parties decreased. Data shows that in post-Soeharto elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019) Islamic Party votes respectively were 38,10%, 40,32%, 29,49%, 31,41%, 30,05%, on the other hand, Nationalist parties respectively 61,90%, 59,68%, 70,51%, 68,59%, and 69,95% (Table 3). Regarding the Islamic parties (Islam inclusive and Islamist), Islamist Parties have more impact from

the incident of terrorism attacks. Indeed, these accidents were harmful to the Islamist Party since the Muslim voter feared the radical Movement correlated with the Islamic Political Movement. The case in Jakarta as the Central Government area, according to Weis, „parties supporting sharia law specifically (the Jakarta Charter) garnered less than 20 percent that year, then increased their share only to around 21 percent in 2004, before declining to around 16.5 percent in 2009; even adding in parties merely linked to Islamist mass organizations, their combined vote share dropped from 37.5 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2009. Most Islamist parties in all three elections campaigned more on general issues such as corruption and the economy than on Islam per se, (Hosain, 2016) Nonetheless, as an exception is the increasing share of the vote of PKS (1999 PK), 1.36% in 1999, rose to 7.20% in 2004.

Table 3

Comparison of the Vote of Islamic Party vs. Secular Inclusive Party in Indonesia

Typology of Party		Electoral Vote (%)						
		Party	1955	Party	1999	2004	2009	2014
Islamist	Masyumi	20,90	PBB	1,94	2,56	1,79	1,46	0,79
			PKS	1,36	7,20	7,88	6,79	8,21
			PPP	10,71	8,16	5,32	6,53	4,52
	Total	20,90		14,01	17,92	14,99	14,78	13,52
Inclusive	NU	18,40	PAN	7,12	6,47	6,01	7,59	6,84
	others	4,40	PKB	12,61	11,98	4,94	9,04	9,96
	Total	22,80		19,73	18,45	10,95	16,63	16,53
Islamic Party		43,70		38,10	40,32	29,49	31,41	30,05
Nationalist		56,30		61,90	59,68	70,51	68,59	69,95

Moreover, in the post-Soeharto system, of the parties that were surviving, only three parties had an express Islamic stage, such as PPP (the United Development Party), PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party) and PBB (the Crescent Star Party). The United Development Party (PPP) represents a fused party drawing in different areas on both modernist and traditionalist Muslims for support. According to Uffen, „the PPP tried to combine the strength of the NU (now a social organization and part of the PPP) and modernist organizations close to the still-banned Masyumi. As a result, the PPP was strongest in regions with a high percentage of orthodox Muslims (for instance, Aceh and West Sumatra), (Ufen, 2008). In 1999, the PPP was the „Islamic Party“ and the only genuinely Islamist party that ran and gained 58 seats.

On the other hand, *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party, PK) must change to *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous and Justice Party, PKS) since it did not fulfill the electoral threshold

of 2,5%. PK/PKS was founded by leaders of the dakwah (missionary) movement Tarbiyah as a group's political wing at the onset of the democratic transition in 1998. Inspired by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, the party elites initially pursued their struggle to achieve an Islamic society based on Sharia through democratic means,,(Kikue, 2011). However, the lack of electoral performance in the 1999 election has convinced PKS to do internal party reform for survival. Under a slightly changed name, PKS had run as PK in the 1999 election, and a more moderate platform election results did indeed improve in 2004. Moreover, „between 2004 and 2014, the pragmatists held the upper hand in this struggle, but stagnant election results have recently prompted a resurgence of the idealist faction within PKS“ (Fionna & Tomsa, 2017).

On the other hand, two parties are included in the category of inclusive Islam, such as the PKB and the PAN (Table 3). The PKB correlates with the NU, and PAN correlates with Muhammadiyah. According to Buehler, PKB and PAN as Islamic parties and Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as mass organizations are individual subsidiaries. However, their political impact has seen a decline in recent times. The rift of Islamic authority in civil society, low party cohesion, and different organizational changes have significantly reduced opportunities for legislative seats in Indonesia. This consequence is for the Islamic inclusive and Islamist parties. The most surprising thing appeared around the last decade for the East Java region, a conventional Nahdlatul Ulama fortress, where the PKB affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama had misplaced its grip on the masses. The share of PKB from voting in local administrative races was reduced from 36% in 1999 to 31% in 2004 and 12% in 2009 (Buehler, 2009).

The decrease in the Islamic vote affects Muslims' refusal of fundamentalist Islam that promotes Islamic Law. „If community members want Islamic law to be carried out by the government, we should expect them to support Islamist parties. They should vote for PPP, PBB, or PK, the three largest Islamist parties (all known to survey respondents as Islamist parties). Nevertheless, in 1999, only 14 percent of voters (in a population that is 87 percent Muslim) cast their ballots for such parties (Mujani et al., 2020). Accordingly, in developing democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia, Islamist parties will find it very difficult to develop, considering that most Indonesian Muslims are of moderate Islamic ideology. Therefore, even with an electoral system that has a threshold below 5%, it will be difficult for parties based on hard-line Islam to get seats in Parliament. Thus, the future of democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia will be filled more with parties whose ideology is moderate Islam, given that most

Indonesian Muslims, including moderate Islamic groups, do not like violence and terrorism. The more violence and terrorism, the more drowned the party is, which has a fundamentalist ideology (Islamist Party).

Conclusion

Along with the many acts of violence and terrorism in all regions of Indonesia, the position of Indonesian Muslims is in the spotlight. Even the issue of violence and terrorism has become a psychological pressure itself, not only for non-Muslims but also for Muslims themselves. This psychological pressure, directly and indirectly, impacts political choices when elections are held. Parties labeled as Islamic or considered to have sociological and sociological ties with Islam are abandoned mainly by their constituents by voting or swinging to secular parties. Quantitatively, the number of votes of both inclusive and Islamist Islamic parties continued to decline. In the 2019 elections, the votes of Islamic and inclusive parties were 13.52% and 16.53%, respectively, and the rest were for the secular, inclusive parties. If compared with the votes of the secular, inclusive party, the number of votes of the secular party is greater than the votes of the Islamic party. Although Indonesian Muslims are prominent, Muslim voters do not all choose the Islamic party. The comparison of the votes of the pro-pluralism party is far greater than the votes of the Islamist party. This condition can be interpreted that supporting a parliamentary majority vote is not possible to encourage the establishment of the Khilafah Islamiyah, which means replacing the ideology of Pancasila. With the solidity of Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state, tolerance and freedom as a symbol of pluralism are still maintained. If pluralism continues to occur, democracy also remains safe.

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